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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Klaus Gomez-Alas, a

man from the Philippines who was working as a

seasonal employee for the Sun Valley Company, appeals from his judgment of conviction for
infamous crime against nature, stemming from a sexual encounter he had with Stefani Zalazar, a
from Paraguay, in her Sun Valley dorm room. The jury found Mr. Gomez guilty of
misdemeanor battery (a lesser-included offense of rape), and infamous crime against nature,
based on his penetration of his tongue into Ms. Zalazar's vaginal opening against her will.
Mr. Gomez raises three issues on appeal. First, he contends the district court erred in concluding
the act of cunnilingus constitutes an infamous crime against nature within the meaning of Idaho
Code §§ 18-6605 and 18-6606. Second, he contends the evidence was insufficient to support his
conviction for infamous crime against nature as there was no evidence that his tongue penetrated
Ms. Zalazar's vaginal opening and no evidence that the act he performed was against
Ms. Zalazar' s will. Third, he contends the district court erred in providing the jury with a
dynamite instruction after it indicated it could not reach a unanimous decision on the charge of
infamous crime against nature.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Mr. Gomez, age 22, obtained his bachelor's degree from St. Paul University in the
Philippines, and was working as a cook for the Sun Valley Company and living in a Sun Valley
dormitory in December 2017. (Con£ Docs., pp.63, 69-72.) Mr. Gomez had a sexual encounter
with Ms. Zalazar in her dorm room on December 25, 2017, after both he and Ms. Zalazar had
consumed a significant amount of alcohol. (Con£ Docs., p.65; Tr., p.838, Ls.4-15.) Ms. Zalazar
contacted the police following the encounter to report she had been raped. (Con£ Docs., p.65.)
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Following a limited investigation (involving only a single interview of Ms. Zalazar), Mr. Gomez
was charged by Information with one count of rape and one count of infamous crime against
nature. (R., pp.109-11; Tr., p.594, L.23 - p.595, L.11.) The prosecutor alleged Mr. Gomez
committed an infamous crime against nature "by performing oral sex with a person against that
person's will to-wit: by placing his mouth upon the vagina of Stefani Canete Zalazar .... "
(R., p.110.) These were the first criminal charges of any kind that Mr. Gomez had faced. (Con£
Docs., pp.67-68.)
Ms. Zalazar testified at trial that she went to Dollar Night at Whiskey Jacques on
December 24, 2017, with three of her girlfriends. (Tr., p.538, L.19 - p.539, L.10.) She drank
three tequila shots and some sips of her friend's mixed drink, but felt worse than usual.
(Tr., p.543, Ls.17-23, p.545, Ls.5-7, p.549, Ls.8-12.) Ms. Zalazar and her girlfriends rode home
from the bar in a friend's car. (Tr., p.550, Ls.6-21, p.866, L.19 - p.867, L.21.) Ms. Zalazar threw
up during the ride home and again when she got out of the car. (Tr., p.551, Ls.14-20, p.557,
Ls.17-25.)
Ms. Zalazar testified that her friends helped her change out of her clothes, and the next
thing she remembers is that "[t]here was somebody on top of [her]" in her bed (the top bunk of a
bunk bed, with her roommate sleeping below). (Tr., p.563, Ls.6-8, p.580, Ls.11-12.) She said she
woke up because she felt "[p]ain in [her] vagina." (Tr., p.563, Ls.11-12.) She testified the person
on top of her, who she later determined was Mr. Gomez, was penetrating her with "[h]is penis."
(Tr., p.564, Ls.18-21.) She testified Mr. Gomez then performed oral sex on her. (Tr., p.565,
Ls.20-25.) She was asked, "Did you feel anything penetrate your vagina at that point?" and she
answered, "I felt that it was being licked." (Tr., p.566, Ls.5-7.) She testified Mr. Gomez then
"kissed me" and she kissed him back. (Tr., p.566, Ls.12-17.) She testified Mr. Gomez next
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"grabbed my head so that I could do oral sex to him" and she inserted his penis into her mouth
for "[m]aybe a minute." (Tr., p.567, L.8 - p.568, L.9.) After that, "he moaned Gina's name."
(Tr., p.569, Ls.13-18.) She then "started to push him away." (Tr., p.569, Ls.17-21, p.570, Ls.1719.) She testified on cross-examination that she did not tell Mr. Gomez "no" before he called her
Gina. 1 (Tr., p.642, Ls.19-23.)
After lying in bed briefly with Ms. Zalazar, Mr. Gomez got out of bed and got dressed to
go the bathroom. (Tr., p.579, L.2 -p.580, L.12, p.653, Ls.3-16.) When Mr. Gomez left the room,
Ms. Zalazar put his cell phone and keys in the hallway, locked the door, and began crying,
waking up her roommate. (Tr., p.579, L.2 - p.580, L.12.) Ms. Zalazar went to the bathroom to
take a shower, and Mr. Gomez entered the bathroom through the half-open door and asked her
why she was crying. (Tr., p.580, L.19 - p.581, L.24, p.650, Ls.2-9.) Ms. Zalazar's roommate
came to the bathroom, and Mr. Gomez left the dormitory. (Tr., p.653, L.24 -p.654, L.2.)
After reporting to the police that she was raped, Ms. Zalazar was transported to a local
emergency room, and then to Boise, where she was examined by a forensic sexual assault nurse
examiner. (Tr., p.1042, Ls.17-21, p.1047, Ls.19-22.) The nurse collected routine swabs, which
were later tested by the Idaho State Police Forensic Services. (Tr., p.1051, Ls.10-12.) There was
no semen detected on the swabs taken from Ms. Zalazar's vaginal, rectal, or perinea! areas. 2
(Exs., pp.26-27, 41-42; Tr., p.938, L.12 - p.939, L.17.) The perinea! swab tested positive for

1

Ms. Zalazar testified she met Mr. Gomez when she was with her friend Gina approximately two
weeks before the December 25 incident, after going to Whiskey Jacques. (Tr., p.572, L.20 p.573, L.8.) Mr. Gomez tried to kiss Ms. Zalazar on the lips at that time, but she "gave him [her]
cheek," and he tried again, and she "gave him [her] other cheek." (Tr., p.576, Ls.4-9.)
2
The perinea! area is "the area from the bottom of the vaginal opening to the anus." (Tr., p.1177,
Ls.20-22.) It is outside the vagina. (Tr., p.1070, Ls.12-14.)
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amylase, which is a component of saliva, but there was insufficient DNA for analysis. (Exs.,
p.53; Tr., p.939, L.22 - p.941, L.6.)
During the course of the physical examination, Ms. Zalazar was determined to have a
pre-existing vaginal infection. (Tr., p.1074, L.3 - p.1075, L.11.) The nurse identified what she
described as "a few small, superficial abrasions" on Ms. Zalazar' s fossa navicularis, which is the
area "right below" the vaginal opening. (Tr., p.1053, Ls.13-18; Con£ Exs., p.32.) The nurse was
able to observe the abrasions only with the use of a blue reagent dye. (Tr., p.1057, Ls.4-18.)
Dr. Gabaeff, an emergency physician who testified as an expert for the defense, testified that, in
his opinion, the defects observed with the blue dye were "not abrasions" because there was no
adjacent redness, but simply evidence of Ms. Zalazar's long-standing infection. (Tr., p.1158, L.6
- p.1162, L.5.)
Dr. Gabaeff provided additional testimony regarding Ms. Zalazar's probable blood
alcohol level. He estimated she would have had a blood alcohol level of approximately .14
immediately after drinking what she claimed to have drunk (three shots and some sips of a mixed
drink), and her blood alcohol level would have been approximately .08 at around 3 :00 a.m.,
when the sexual encounter occurred. (Tr., p.1164, L.12 - p.1166, L.10.) Dr. Gabaeff testified he
reviewed the toxicology report and it was negative, meaning "[t]here were no date rape drugs or
other common drugs tested for that alter consciousness." (Tr., p.1174, Ls.21-23.)
Dr. Gabaeff testified Ms. Zalazar's physical condition was "not consistent" with having
just three drinks and a couple sips of other alcohol. (Tr., p.1175, Ls.13-16.) He testified
Ms. Zalazar appeared to be blacked out. (Tr., p.1229, Ls.17-19.) He described the "blacked out"
state as one in which "you appear to be awake to other people, but you have lost the capacity to
record memories of what you're doing." (Tr., p.1169, Ls.15-18.) That is, "appearing to be awake

4

and then retrospectively determining that you have no recollection of what happened during a
period of time." (Tr., p.1171, Ls.14-17.) Dr. Gabaeff testified Ms. Zalazar "could have
participated in a consensual way in that state of being." (Tr., p.1253, Ls.15-18.)
At the close of the State's case, counsel for Mr. Gomez moved for a judgment of acquittal
under Idaho Criminal Rule 29, arguing "there is no basis to believe that cunnilingus is a crime in
Idaho." (Tr., p.1115, L.21 - p.1116, L.8.) The prosecutor argued "the statute certainly
encompasses this kind of penetration . . . as a crime against nature." (Tr., p.1117, Ls.2-8.)
Counsel for Mr. Gomez also argued there was insufficient evidence of penetration. (Tr., p.1117,
Ls.9-15.) The prosecutor argued Mr. Gomez's statement to the investigating officer that "he
licked her vagina" was sufficient evidence of penetration. (Tr., p.1117, Ls.16-22.) Defense
counsel responded that "licking the vagina is not evidence of penetration." (Tr., p.1117, L.23 p.1118, L.2.)
The district court denied Mr. Gomez's motion for a judgment of acquittal. With respect to
the legal question of whether cunnilingus is covered by §§ 18-6605 and 18-6606, the district
court ruled the allegation "should go to the jury." (Tr., p.1136, L.14 - p.1137, L.12.) The district
court noted it would preserve the issue for appeal by asking the jury to make a factual finding on
whether Mr. Gomez was guilty of infamous crime against nature by fellatio, cunnilingus, or both.
(Tr., p.1137, Ls.13-24.) The district court next ruled it was for the jury to decide whether there
was sufficient evidence of penetration. (Tr., p.1138, Ls.16-24.)
Prior to finalizing the jury instructions, the district court asked the parties their position
on consent with respect to Count II, noting the State's proposed jury instruction was "silent on
whether it can be with consent or without consent." (Tr., p.1031, Ls.2-5, p.1031, L.23 - p.1032,
L.1.) Counsel for Mr. Gomez said he believed it had to be nonconsensual because the charging
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document says against her will, and because, under Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003),
"consensual activity of this very nature is not-cannot be criminalized." (Tr., p.1031, Ls.13-22.)
The prosecutor responded that in the State's view, this was a nonconsensual act, and an infamous
crime against nature would only be illegal if it was nonconsensual. (Tr., p.1032, Ls.6-11.) The
district court said it was "very, very happy to hear the State say that." (Tr., p.1032, Ls.16-20.)
The district court ultimately instructed the jury that, to find Mr. Gomez guilty of
infamous crime against nature, the State had to prove either of the following four elements:
1. On or about December 25 th , 2017
2. in the state ofldaho, County of Blaine
3. the defendant, Klaus Nico Gomez-Alas, engaged in conduct consisting of
the penetration, however slight, of
4. the defendant's penis into the oral opemng of Stefani Canete Zalazar
against her will.
OR

1. On or about December 25 th , 2017
2. in the state ofldaho, County of Blaine
3. the defendant, Klaus Nico Gomez-Alas, engaged in conduct consisting of
the penetration, however slight, of
4. the defendant's tongue into the vaginal opening of Stefani Canete Zalazar
against her will.
(R., pp.470-71.)
The jury began deliberating at 4:31 p.m. (Tr., p.1502, L.7.) The jury sent a note to the
district court at 8:36 p.m. (Tr., p.1502, Ls.20-25; Exs., p.5.) As described by the court:
They just gave their status, their vote on the various counts and lesser included
offenses. By this note, I would infer that they have reached a unanimous verdict
of not guilty on rape, but-and, curiously, a unanimous verdict of guilty on
battery, but they shouldn't get to the battery until they go through the lesser
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included of battery with intent to commit rape. On that one, which is 20.2, they
say, '10 NG, 2 G.' I don't know what that means. And then they show 8 G, 4 NG
on 20.4, which is Count Two.
(Tr., p.1503, Ls.4-17; Exs., p.5.) After receiving input from counsel, the district court sent the
jury a note at 8:48 p.m. stating, "Dear Jurors, I would like to know whether you wish to continue
your deliberations. Please let the bailiff know." (Tr., p.1508, Ls.9-12; Exs., p.6.) The jury sent a
note back at 8:51 p.m., saying "We will continue to deliverate [sic] tonight." (Tr., p.1508, Ls.1624; Exs., p.6.)
The jury returned to the courtroom at 9: 13 p.m., informing the court it had reached a
verdict. (Tr., p.1509, L.21 - p.1510, L.5.) The bailiff handed the verdict form to the district
court, and the district court said, "This isn't quite in order yet. Sorry. I do not see what you
decided to do on Count Two." (Tr., p.1510, Ls.10-11.) The district court showed the verdict form
to counsel for the parties. (Tr., p.1510, Ls.12-14.) Without asking counsel for their input, the
district court instructed the jury as follows:
I appreciate where -- the time and effort you've put into it. The way this reads -the way I intended it -- I don't know if it read this way to you -- is that you look at
Count -- there are two counts. You looked at Count I. You dealt with that. You
dealt with the lesser included offenses for Count I, but this does not show what
your verdict is for Count II, the infamous crime against nature. And I don't know
-- you know, of course, I'm not in there, so I don't know what happened there. I
don't know. But I would ask that you go back and visit that count. We need to
have a decision on Count II. That's on the second page under Count II.
(Tr., p.1510, L.15 -p.1511, L.1 (emphasis added).)
Counsel for Mr. Gomez asked to approach, and the district court held a discussion with
counsel for both parties off the record. (Tr., p.1511, Ls.2-7.) The district court then instructed the
jury, "I would like to you to consider Count II." (Tr., p.1511, Ls.17-18.) The jury resumed its
deliberations at 9:17 p.m. (Tr., p.1511, L.20.) Outside the presence of the jury, counsel for
Mr. Gomez argued he was "a little concerned" that the instruction the court gave was "close to a
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dynamite charge" by implying to the jury that it needed to render a verdict on Count II.
(Tr., p.1511, L.24-p.1512, L.6.)
The jury returned to the courtroom at 9:28 p.m. (Tr., p.1513, Ls.1-6.) On Count I, the jury
found Mr. Gomez not guilty of rape, and not guilty of the lesser included offense of battery with
intent to commit rape, but guilty of the lesser included offense of battery. (Tr., p.1513, L.19 p.1514, L.3; Con£ Docs., pp.55-56.) On Count II, the jury found Mr. Gomez guilty of infamous
crime against nature based on "penetration, however slight, of the defendant's tongue into the
vaginal opening of Stefani Canete Zalazar." (Tr., p.1514, Ls.4-8; Con£ Docs., p.56.)
Mr. Gomez filed a motion for a new trial under Idaho Criminal Rule 34, arguing he was
entitled to a new trial because "an improper dynamite instruction was given to the jury directing
the jury to come to a verdict or answer Count II on the Verdict Form." (R., pp.510-16.)
Mr. Gomez also filed a motion for a judgment of acquittal under Idaho Criminal Rule 29,
arguing there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict that Mr. Gomez committed
an infamous crime against nature. (R., pp.517-22.) Following a hearing, the district court issued a
written memorandum decision and order denying both of Mr. Gomez's motions. (R., pp.553-77.)
The district court sentenced Mr. Gomez for infamous crime against nature to a unified
term of six years, with four years fixed, and retained jurisdiction. (Tr., p.1723, Ls.17-24.) For
battery, the district court sentenced Mr. Gomez to six months in county jail, to be served
concurrently. (Tr., p.1724, Ls.4-7.) The judgment of conviction was filed on January 15, 2019,
and Mr. Gomez filed a timely notice of appeal on January 23, 2019. (R., pp.609-22.)
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ISSUES
I.

Did the district court err in concluding that the act of cunnilingus constitutes an infamous
crime against nature within the meaning ofldaho Code §§ 18-6605 & 18-6606?

II.

Was the evidence sufficient to support Mr. Gomez's conviction where there was no
evidence that his tongue penetrated Ms. Zalazar's vaginal opening and no evidence that
the act he performed was against Ms. Zalazar's will?

III.

Did the district court err in providing the jury with a dynamite instruction after it
indicated it could not reach a unanimous decision on the charge of infamous crime
against nature?

9

ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Erred In Concluding That The Act Of Cunnilingus Constitutes An Infamous
Crime Against Nature Within The Meaning Ofldaho Code§§ 18-6605 & 18-6606

A.

Introduction
Mr. Gomez was convicted of infamous crime against nature based on the "penetration,

however slight, of [his] tongue into the vaginal opening of Stefani Canete Zalazar." (Tr., p.1514,
Ls.4-8; Con£ Docs., p.56.) The district court concluded the act of cunnilingus, defined in Black's
Law Dictionary as "[t]he sexual act involving oral stimulation of a person's vulva or clitoris,"
constitutes an infamous crime against nature. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 11th ed. 2019. In
reaching this decision, the district court properly recognized that whether Idaho Code§§ 18-6605
and 18-6606 prohibit cunnilingus has not been decided by an appellate court in Idaho, and courts
in other jurisdictions are split on the issue. See R., p.564; see also ICJI 920 cmt. The district
court erred as a matter of law in interpreting § § 18-6605 and 18-6606 to prohibit cunnilingus.

B.

Standard Of Review
The interpretation of a statute presents a legal question over which this Court exercises

free review. State v. Thiel, 158 Idaho 103, 106 (2015). Statutory construction "must begin with
the literal words of the statute" and "those words must be given their plain, usual and ordinary
meaning." City of Sandpoint v. Sandpoint Indep. Highway Dist., 139 Idaho 65, 69 (2003)
(citations omitted). "If the statute is not ambiguous, this Court does not construe it, but simply
follows the law as written." Id. (citation omitted). If a statute is capable of more than one
reasonable interpretation, then this Court must construe the statute "to mean what the legislature
intended for it to mean." City of Sandpoint, 139 Idaho at 69 (citation omitted). In determining
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legislative intent, this Court "examine[ s] not only the literal words of the statute, but also the
reasonableness of proposed constructions, the public policy behind the statute, and its legislative
history." Id. (citations omitted).

C.

The District Court Erred As A Matter Of Law In Interpreting Idaho Code §§ 18-6605 &
18-6606 To Prohibit Cunnilingus
Idaho Code § 18-6605 states, in full, that "[ e]very person who is guilty of the infamous

cnme against nature, committed with mankind or with any animal, is punishable by
imprisonment in the state prison not less than five years." Idaho Code § 18-6606 states, in full,
that "[a]ny sexual penetration, however slight, is sufficient to complete the crime against nature."
Giving the words in these statutes their plain, usual, and ordinary meanings does not resolve the
question of whether cunnilingus is a prohibited crime against nature. The statutes make no
reference to the type of sexual penetration that constitutes the crime. Thus, these statues are
ambiguous, and this Court must construe these statutes "to mean what the legislature intended
for [them] to mean." City of Sandpoint, 139 Idaho at 69 (citation omitted).
The district court concluded the statutes prohibit cunnilingus because the court "does not
believe that there is any rational basis for the state legislature to treat a non-consensual act of oral
sex differently depending on whether it is fellatio or cunnilingus." (R., p.564, n.3.) The district
court found support for its conclusion in State v. Maland, 124 Idaho 830 (Ct. App. 1993). (See
R., p.564, n.3.) But Maland does not support the district court's conclusion, and there is indeed a

rational basis for the legislature to treat fellatio and cunnilingus differently-that rational
difference stems from what the legislature intended to prohibit back when it first criminalized the
infamous crime against nature over 150 years ago.
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In Maland, the Court of Appeals considered whether the district court erred when it
refused to dismiss the charge of infamous crime against nature following the preliminary
hearing. 124 Idaho at 832. The defendant argued the victim's testimony was insufficient to
support the charge, as she testified only that the defendant performed oral sex on her, not that he
penetrated her. Id. The Court explained that its "review of this issue is limited" because the
victim testified at trial that the defendant "penetrated her with his tongue" and, critically, the
defendant "has not disputed the fairness of the trial, but focuses only on the preliminary

hearing." Id. (emphasis added). The Court explained that, when a defendant has been convicted
following a fair trial, it "will not examine on appeal the sufficiency of the evidence at a
preliminary hearing . . . ." Id. (citations omitted). Because the defendant in Maland did not
dispute the fairness of the trial, the Court's decision in Maland cannot be read to mean that
cunnilingus is prohibited under§§ 18-6605 and 18-6606.
The question presented in this case is thus one of first impression-did the Idaho
Legislature intend to prohibit cunnilingus as an infamous crime against nature? This is a difficult
question to answer considering the lack of specificity in the statutory language, and the changing
public attitudes towards certain types of sexual conduct. Significantly, the statutes prohibiting
infamous crime against nature have not been changed in substance since their adoption in 1864,
over 150 years ago. (See R., p.571.)
Under the common law, infamous crime against nature was the same as sodomy, and
consisted of sexual intercourse in any bodily opening between a human and an animal and anal
intercourse between humans. See ICJI 920 cmt.; see also People v. Martinez, 188 Cal.App.3d 19,
22-24 (Cal. App. 1986). In State v. Altwatter, 29 Idaho 107 (1916), the Idaho Supreme Court
interpreted the predecessor to §§ 18-6605 and 18-6606 to prohibit not just sodomy, but all
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infamous crimes against nature. Id. The Court explained it was "of the opinion that [the statute
prohibiting infamous crime against nature] is sufficiently broad to include not only the crime of
sodomy, but also all unnatural carnal copulations, whether with man or beast." Id. The Idaho
Supreme Court has held multiple times that "the act of fellatio is included within the statutory
definition of crimes against nature," meaning it is an unnatural carnal copulation. See, e.g., State

v. Izatt, 96 Idaho 667, 669-70 (1975), see also State v. Brashier, 127 Idaho 730, 733 (Ct. App.
1995) (citing cases).
In People v. Smith, 101 N.E. 957 (Ill. 1913), the Illinois Supreme Court held the Illinois
statute prohibiting the crime against nature "is more extensive than sodomy" but, in all cases in
which convictions had been sustained, "the male sexual organ was involved." Id. at 958. The

Smith Court noted this was necessarily the case at common law "for both penetration and
emission were essential elements of the offense." Id.
It would be reasonable to believe the Idaho Legislature, in prohibiting the infamous crime
against nature, believed, like the Smith Court, that the crime must involve the male sexual organ.
That is consistent with the Idaho Supreme Court's holding in Altwatter, 29 Idaho 107, and with
the subsequent decisions of the Court including fellatio within the definition of the offense. See,

e.g., Izatt, 96 Idaho at 669-70, see also Brashier, 127 Idaho at 733. While this thinking may seem
dated, the goal of statutory interpretation is to determinate legislative intent, not to ensure gender
equity. See City of Sandpoint, 139 Idaho at 69 (stating that if a statute is capable of more than
one reasonable interpretation, this Court must construe the statute "to mean what the legislature
intended for it to mean") (citation omitted). There is no indication that the Idaho legislature
intended to prohibit cunnilingus when it criminalized the infamous crime against nature.
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II.
The Evidence Was Insufficient To Support Mr. Gomez's Conviction Because There Was No
Evidence That His Tongue Penetrated Ms. Zalazar's Vaginal Opening And No Evidence That
The Act He Performed Was Against Ms. Zalazar's Will

A.

Introduction
The evidence was insufficient to support Mr. Gomez's conviction for infamous crime

against nature because there was no evidence that Mr. Gomez's tongue penetrated Ms. Zalazar's
vaginal opening. There was also no evidence that the act Mr. Gomez performed which formed
the basis of the infamous crime against nature charge was against Ms. Zalazar's will.

B.

Standard Of Review
"Appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence is limited in scope." State v.

Southwick, 158 Idaho 173, 177 (Ct. App. 2014). "The relevant inquiry is ... whether after
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." State v.

Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 460 (2012) (quotation marks, emphasis, and citation omitted). The
Court "is required to consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the State," and will not
substitute its "judgment for that of the jury on issues of witness credibility, weight of the
evidence, or reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence." Id. (citation omitted). The
Court will disregard a jury's verdict only where the evidence is insufficient for any rational jury
to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Tryon, 164 Idaho 254, 257
(2018).
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C.

There Was No Evidence That Mr. Gomez's Tongue Penetrated Ms. Zalazar's Vaginal
Opening
The jury found Mr. Gomez guilty of infamous cnme against nature based on the

defendant's tongue penetrating "into the vaginal opening" of Ms. Zalazar "against her will."
(R., pp.470-71.) After the verdict was rendered, Mr. Gomez filed a motion for a judgment of
acquittal, arguing, among other things, that the evidence was insufficient to show penetration.
(R., pp.517-22.) The district court denied Mr. Gomez's motion, concluding the following
evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdict with respect to penetration:
When Mr. Gomez was interviewed by Officer Logsdon, he said he "licked"
Ms. Zalazar "at her clitoris."
Ms. Zalazar testified at trial, "He went down." She was asked, "And where
did he put his head?" and she answered, "In my vagina." She was asked, "Did
you feel anything penetrate your vagina at that point?" and she answered, "I
felt that it was being licked."
Dr. King, the State's expert, testified, with reference to the Sexual Assault
Genital Assessment, that the clitoris is within "the bound of the genital
opening itself."
(R., pp.556, 565; Tr., p.565, L.22 - p.566, L.7.) The district court erred in concluding the
evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdict with respect to penetration because even if
the clitoris is within the bounds of the vaginal area, "licking" is not evidence of penetration, even
slight penetration.
In Hicks v. State, 713 P.2d 18 (Okla. Crim. App. 1986), the Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals held the State's evidence was insufficient to show penetration where it showed that the
defendant, "after a difficult struggle with the victim and her daughter, placed his mouth on the
victim's vagina for some six to ten seconds." Id. at 20. The Court noted that while cunnilingus
constitutes the crime against nature under Oklahoma law, the crime requires "sexual penetration,
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however slight," which was lacking. Id. The Hicks Court expressed its displeasure with the
legislative definition of the crime against nature:
It is truly unfortunate that the Oklahoma Legislature has not seen fit to rewrite the
antiquated statutes that make sodomy a crime. Its use of "delicate" language
complicates the enforcement of the crime. First of all, the vague language has
been made comprehensible and therefore constitutional only by case law. And
today a conviction must be reversed because the penetration requirement was
written to encompass all crimes against nature without regard to whether
penetration should be an element of the specific type of sodomy involved. Of
course penetration should be required to prove bestiality. But should not forcible
cunnilingus and fellatio be considered criminal acts even though no penetration is
accomplished?
Under our present statutes, no conviction for the crime of sodomy can stand
without proof of penetration. We are therefore compelled to reverse appellant's
conviction for the crime against nature due to insufficient evidence of this
element.
Id.; see also Salyers v. State, 755 P.2d 97, 100 (Okla. Ct. Crim. App. 1988) (noting the

Oklahoma Legislature did not "rewrite the sodomy statutes to remove the antiquated requirement
of penetration in cases of forcible cunnilingus and fellatio" and therefore reversing and
remanding with instructions to dismiss the convictions of oral sodomy ( female to female) and
aiding and abetting oral sodomy).
Here, the State presented evidence that Mr. Gomez licked Ms. Zalazar at her clitoris or at
her vagina, but evidence of licking is not evidence of penetration. Black's Law Dictionary
defines "penetration" as "[t]he act of piercing or passing something into or through a body or
object" and, for purposes of criminal law, "[t]he entry of the penis or some other part of the body
or foreign object into the vagina or other bodily orifice." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 11th ed.
2019. The word "lick" is not defined in Black's Law Dictionary, but is defined in other
dictionaries as "to draw the tongue over" and "to pass the tongue over the surface of, as to
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moisten, taste, or eat." MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S ONLINE DICTIONARY at https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/lick; DICTIONARY. COM at https ://www .dictionary.com/browse. lick.
Idaho Code § 18-6606 states that "[ a ]ny penetration, however slight, is sufficient to
complete the crime against nature." Here, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
State, there was insufficient evidence that Mr. Gomez's tongue penetrated, even slightly, into
Ms. Zalazar's vaginal opening. The evidence was thus insufficient to support Mr. Gomez's
conviction for infamous crime against nature.

D.

There Was No Evidence That The Act Mr. Gomez Performed Was Against Ms. Zalazar's
Will
As discussed above, the jury found Mr. Gomez guilty of infamous crime against nature

based on the defendant's tongue penetrating "into the vaginal opening" of Ms. Zalazar "against
her will." (R., pp.470-71.) After the verdict was rendered, Mr. Gomez filed a motion for a
judgment of acquittal, arguing, among other things, that the evidence was insufficient to show
that the act he performed which formed the basis of his conviction was against Ms. Zalazar' s
will. (R., pp.517-22.) He argued the act might have been against her consent (broadly defined),
but it was not against her will, relying in part on Idaho Code § 18-6608, which defines when
forcible penetration by a foreign object is "[a]gainst the victim's will." (R., pp.520-21.) The
district court concluded the State did not need to show that Mr. Gomez's actions were against
Ms. Zalazar's will within the meaning of§ 18-6608 because the statute prohibiting infamous
crime against nature does not specify that the act be against the victim's will (even though the
jury was so instructed in this case). (R., pp.568-72.) The district court said that any distinction
between the terms "against her will" and "non-consensual" is "not meaningful" under the facts of
this case." (R., p.573.)
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The district court erred in concluding there was sufficient evidence to show that the act
Mr. Gomez performed was against Ms. Zalazar's will. The district court correctly noted that
neither Idaho Code §§ 18-6605 nor 18-6606 require, as an element of the offense of infamous
crime against nature, that the sexual penetration be non-consensual or against the victim's will.
However, this element must be read into the offense in order for it to withstand constitutional
scrutiny.
Courts are not typically "empowered to change the plain meanmg of unambiguous
legislation or to insert into statutes qualifying terms or provisions that obviously are not there."
State v. Holden, 126 Idaho 755, 761 (Ct. App. 1995) (citations omitted). And, there are no words

in §§ 18-6605 or 18-6606 that reasonably could be interpreted to exclude from its reach private
consensual conduct See id. However, this does not mean these statutes are unenforceable in all
contexts. See id. ("A statute that is overbroad in its scope and thereby abridges protected
freedoms generally need not be stricken in its entirety.") Instead, the statutes have been "declared
invalid to the extent that [they reach] too far, but otherwise left intact." Id. (quotation marks and
citation omitted).
Consistent with Holden, and in light of Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), 3 the
district court confirmed with the prosecutor prior to fmalizing the jury instructions that, in the
State's view, an infamous crime against nature would only be illegal if it was nonconsensual or
against the victim's will. (Tr., p.1032, Ls.6-11.) Thus, without an objection from counsel, the

3

In Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. at 564-78, the United States Supreme Court held the
petitioners, two gay men, were free as adults to engage in private sexual conduct in the exercise
of their liberty under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). Counsel for Mr. Gomez
referred to Lawrence in the district court in arguing the State had to prove his client's conduct
was nonconsensual in order to obtain a conviction. (Tr., p.1031, Ls.13-22.)
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district court instructed the jury consistent with the allegation in the Information that it had to
find the defendant's "penetration, however slight" was against Ms. Zalazar's will. (R., pp.110,
4 70-71.) The evidence was insufficient to show that the defendant's penetration of his tongue
into Ms. Zalazar's vaginal opening was "against her will," and the district court erred in all but
reading out this requirement.
The statutes prohibiting infamous crime against nature do not define "against the will"
because, as discussed above, it is not a statutory element of the offense. The phrase "against the
victim's will" is defmed in Idaho Code § 18-6608, which prohibits forcible penetration by use of
a foreign object. That statue states:
Every person who willfully causes the penetration, however slight, of the genital
or anal opening of another person, by any object, instrument or device:
(1)

(2)
(3)
(4)

Against the victim's will by:
(a)
Use of force or violence; or
(b)
Duress; or
(c)
Threats of immediate and great bodily harm, accompanied by
apparent power of execution; or
Where the victim is incapable, through any unsoundness of mind, whether
temporary or permanent, of giving legal consent; or
Where the victim is prevented from resistance by any intoxicating,
narcotic or anesthetic substance; or
Where the victim is at the time unconscious of the nature of the act
because the victim:
(a)
Was unconscious or asleep; or
(b)
Was not aware, knowing, perceiving or cognizant that the act
occurred;

shall be guilty of a felony and shall be punished by imprisonment in the state
prison for not more than life.
I.C. § 18-6608. As set forth in this statute, the act of penetration by use of a foreign object is
against the victim's will if the person who caused the penetration uses force or violence, duress,
or threats of immediate and great bodily harm, accompanied by apparent power of execution. Id.
The State did not present any evidence that, in performing oral sex on Ms. Zalazar, Mr. Gomez
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used force or violence, duress, or threats of immediate and great bodily harm, accompanied by
apparent power of execution. On the contrary, all of the evidence presented at trial suggests
Ms. Zalazar willingly participated, or at least did not resist in any way, Mr. Gomez's act of nonforceful, non-violent oral sex.
Ms. Zalazar testified on cross-examination regarding the oral sex as follows:
Q.

Now, after what you described as-after you woke up, you said he
performed oral sex on you.

A.

Yes.

Q.

That's the next thing. Okay.
And did you tell him to stop at that point?

A.

No, I was very confused and couldn't really move or say anything.

Q.

But, basically, you didn't tell him no?

A.

No.

Q.

And at that time you were naked and uncovered; is that right?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Okay. And he did not hold you down at that time, did he?
(Interpreter translates.)

A.

No, because I was laying down and weak, couldn't move.

Q.

Okay. But he didn't hold you down?

A.

No.

Q.

And then had you pushed him away at that point when he was performing
oral sex with you?

A.

No.

Q.

And he wasn't preventing you from getting up, was he?

A.

No.
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Q.

And you didn't hit him or scratch him?

A.

No.

(Tr., p.636, L.25 - p.638, L.1.) Ms. Zalazar testified that after Mr. Gomez performed oral sex on
her, he kissed her on the lips, and she kissed him back. (Tr., p.566, Ls.5-20.) Ms. Zalazar then
performed oral sex on Mr. Gomez. (Tr., p.567, L.5 - p.568, L.9.) There is no evidence to support
a finding that the oral sex Mr. Gomez performed on Ms. Zalazar was "against her will."
There is a meaningful difference between an act that is performed without consent, or
without affirmative consent, and an act that is performed against a person's will. Black's Law
Dictionary defines "consent" in pertinent part as "[a] voluntary yielding to what another
proposes or desires; agreement, approval, or permission regarding some act or purpose, esp.
given voluntarily by a competent person." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 11th ed. 2019.
"Affirmative consent" has been defined more narrowly as "the idea that before sexual
intercourse, both partners should display an affirmative desire to continue their sexual activity"
and "dictates that consent cannot be given if one party is impaired by drugs or alcohol, or is
incapacitated due to sleep or unconsciousness." Eric Sandoval, The Case for an Affirmative

Consent Provision in Rape Law, 94 N.D. L. REV. 455,469 (2019). The fact that Ms. Zalazar may
not have affirmatively consented to having oral sex performed on her, does not make
Mr. Gomez's performance of that act against her will, either as defined in § 18-6608 or under a
general understanding of these words. The evidence was insufficient to support Mr. Gomez's
conviction for infamous crime against nature, as charged and as instructed, and his conviction
should be vacated.
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III.
The District Court Erred In Providing The Jury With A Dynamite Instruction After It Indicated It
Could Not Reach A Unanimous Decision On The Charge Oflnfamous Crime Against Nature

A.

Introduction
After previously indicating it could not reach a unanimous decision, but wanted to keep

deliberating, the jury informed the district court it had reached a verdict, and handed the bailiff a
verdict form with a verdict on Count I, but no verdict on Count II. Without asking counsel for
their input, the district court instructed the jury that "[w ]e need to have a decision on Count II."
Approximately ten minutes after resuming its deliberations, the jury returned to the courtroom,
having checked the box on Count II finding Mr. Gomez guilty of infamous crime against nature.
The district court denied Mr. Gomez's motion for a new trial, concluding its instruction did not
amount to a dynamite instruction and was not coercive. (R., p.558.) The district court noted it
told the jury it would like it to consider Count II, not that it had to consider Count II. (R., p.561.)
The district court erred in denying Mr. Gomez's motion for a new trial as the court, albeit
inadvertently, provided the jury with a coercive instruction that it had to provide a verdict on
Count II after it appears the jury was deadlocked.

B.

Standard Of Review
This Court reviews a district court's decision on a motion for a new trial under an abuse

of discretion standard. State v. Eddins, 142 Idaho 423, 425 (Ct. App. 2006). When this Court
reviews an alleged abuse of discretion, it considers "[w]hether the trial court (1) correctly
perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion;
(3) acted consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it;
and (4) reached its decision by the exercise of reason." Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho
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856, 863 (2018) (citation omitted). "The standard of review for this Court when examining a
court's decision to give a particular jury instruction is one of free review." State v. Nath, 137
Idaho 712, 716, 52 P.3d 857, 861 (2002) (citation omitted).

C.

The District Court Erred In Denying Mr. Gomez's Motion For A New Trial As The Court
Provided The Jury With A Coercive Instruction That It Had To Provide A Verdict On
Count II After It Appears The Jury Was Deadlocked
The jury began its deliberations in this case at 4:31 p.m. on the sixth day of trial.

(Tr., p.1502, L.7; R., pp.446-51) The jury sent an unsolicited note to the district court at 8:36
p.m. (Tr., p.1502, Ls.20-25; Exs., p.5; R., p.450.) As described by the court:
They just gave their status, their vote on the various counts and lesser included
offenses. By this note, I would infer that they have reached a unanimous verdict
of not guilty on rape, but-and, curiously, a unanimous verdict of guilty on
battery, but they shouldn't get to the battery until they go through the lesser
included of battery with intent to commit rape. On that one, which is 20.2, they
say, '10 NG, 2 G.' I don't know what that means. And then they show 8 G, 4 NG
on 20.4, which is Count Two.
(Tr., p.1503, Ls.4-17; Exs., p.5.) The district court asked counsel for their thoughts, and the
prosecutor said the court should inform the jury it needed to "[k]eep working" or "keep
deliberating." (Tr., p.1503, L.18 - p.1504, L.1.) Counsel for the defense said, "Well, I think you
probably need to ask them whether they are at an impasse or not or whether future deliberations
will assist them." (Tr., p.1504, Ls.4-6.) The district court ultimately sent the jury a note stating,
"Dear Jurors, I would like to know whether you wish to continue your deliberations. Please let
the bailiff know." (Tr., p.1508, Ls.9-12; Exs., p.6.) The note was sent to the jury at 8:48 p.m.,
and the jury sent a note back at 8:51 p.m., saying "We will continue to deliverate [sic] tonight."
(Tr., p.1508, Ls.16-24; Exs., p.6.)
The jury returned to the courtroom at 9: 13 p.m., informing the court it had reached a
verdict. (Tr., p.1509, L.21 - p.1510, L.5.) The bailiff handed the verdict form to the district
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court, and the district court said, "This isn't quite in order yet. Sorry. I do not see what you
decided to do on Count Two." (Tr., p.1510, Ls.10-11.) The district court showed the verdict form
to counsel for the parties. (Tr., p.1510, Ls.12-14.) Without asking counsel for their input, the
district court instructed the jury as follows:
I appreciate where -- the time and effort you've put into it. The way this reads -the way I intended it -- I don't know if it read this way to you -- is that you look at
Count -- there are two counts. You looked at Count I. You dealt with that. You
dealt with the lesser included offenses for Count I, but this does not show what
your verdict is for Count II, the infamous crime against nature. And I don't know
-- you know, of course, I'm not in there, so I don't know what happened there. I
don't know. But I would ask that you go back and visit that count. We need to
have a decision on Count II. That's on the second page under Count II.

(Tr., p.1510, L.15 -p.1511, L.1 (emphasis added).)
Counsel for Mr. Gomez asked to approach, and the district court held a discussion with
counsel for both parties off the record. (Tr., p.1511, Ls.2-7.) The district court then provided this
further instruction to the jury:
I want to be clear that this is -- when I say you need to look at it, please talk. I
don't want you to feel any pressure. Do what you need to do. Review it. You
returned a verdict on one count and the lesser included. We need the other -- we
need you to evaluate the other count.
I know it's late. Do you wish to continue?

Let me tell you this. You can go back there and decide if you want to continue or
not and let me know. But I want you guys to decide, but we -- I would like you to
consider Count II. Okay.
(Tr., p.1511, Ls.8-18.) The jury resumed its deliberations at 9:17 p.m. (Tr., p.1511, L.20.)
Outside the presence of the jury, counsel for Mr. Gomez argued he was "a little concerned" that
the instruction the court gave was "close to a dynamite charge" by implying to the jury that it
needed to render a verdict on Count II. (Tr., p.1511, L.24 - p.1512, L.6.) The district court
responded as follows:
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Okay. Well, I appreciate that, but they need to fill in the boxes. They have not
completed their task, and they need to get to Count II and evaluate it.
I was not asked -- I hope I made it clear, I'm not asking them -- demanding that
they do it, I'm not coercive in nature. I'm not instructing them to do it.
I appreciate your comment earlier. I tried to make it sound that this is -- they need
to at least consider it, and that's all I was trying to do. And you can preserve the
record, but what was said was said and we'll take it from there.
(Tr., p.1512, Ls.7-18.)
The jury returned to the courtroom at 9:28 p.m. (Tr., p.1513, Ls.1-6.) On Count I, the jury
found Mr. Gomez not guilty of rape, and not guilty of the lesser included offense of battery with
intent to commit rape, but guilty of the lesser included offense of battery. (Tr., p.1513, L.19 p.1514, L.3; Con£ Docs., pp.55-56.) On Count II, the jury found Mr. Gomez guilty of infamous
crime against nature based on "penetration, however slight, of the defendant's tongue into the
vaginal opening of Stefani Canete Zalazar." (Tr., p.1514, Ls.4-8; Con£ Docs., p.56.)
Mr. Gomez filed a motion for a new trial under Idaho Criminal Rule 34, arguing he was
entitled to a new trial because "an improper dynamite instruction was given to the jury directing
the jury to come to a verdict or answer Count II on the Verdict Form." (R., pp.510-16.) At the
hearing on Mr. Gomez's post-trial motions, counsel for Mr. Gomez argued the only explanation
for the jury not having an answer on Count II was that "they remained split." (10/29/18 Tr., p.10,
Ls.11-23.) Defense counsel argued the court "had a duty to ask them why they hadn't answered
that count." (10/29/18 Tr., p.12, Ls.5-8.) Defense counsel further argued the court erred "in
instructing [the jury] that they have to complete the box." (10/29/18 Tr., p.17, Ls.6-7.)
The district court erred in denying Mr. Gomez's Rule 34 motion as the instruction it
provided to the jury was a prohibited dynamite instruction. A dynamite instruction "is an
instruction directing a deadlocked jury to continue deliberating and exhorts those jurors holding
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a minority view to reconsider their position." State v. Martinez, 122 Idaho 158, 162 (Ct. App.
1992) (citation omitted). "Such instructions are referred to as 'dynamite' because they proved to
be effective in 'blasting' verdicts out of potentially deadlocked juries." Id. (citation omitted). The
Idaho Supreme Court held in State v. Flint, 114 Idaho 806 (1988), that "the future use of
dynamite instructions is not consistent with the orderly administration of criminal justice" and
adopted a "blanket prohibition against dynamite instructions" in order to "protect ... deadlocked
jurors from coercion." Id. at 812. In this respect, Idaho "provides greater protection to the
defendant" than federal law. State v. Pullin, 152 Idaho 82, 85 (Ct. App. 2011).
The Idaho Supreme Court's holding in Flint is consistent with empirical research, which
"suggests that, far from encouraging jurors to fulfill their duty to reach a reasoned and
conscientious judgment on the evidence, [dynamite] charges coerce minority jurors into
abdicating their beliefs and substituting the majority's views for their own." Samantha P.
Bateman, Blast It All: Allen Charges and the Dangers of Playing with Dynamite, 32 U. HAW. L.
REV. 323, 333 (2010). "Indeed, the available empirical evidence demonstrates that . . .

a dynamite instruction in any formulation is inescapably coercive, especially for those jurors
holding the dissenting viewpoint." Id. at 333-34; see also Sarah Thimsen, Brian H. Bornstein,
Monica K. Miller, The Dynamite Charge: Too Explosive for Its Own Good?, 44

VAL.

U. L. REV.

93, 110 (2009) ("In cases involving the dynamite charge, then, it seems clear that jurors would
feel pressure from an authority figure (i.e., the judge) and comply with his request, even if
compliance does not gel with the juror's individual preference.").
While establishing a blanket prohibition against dynamite instruction, the Flint Court
stated a trial court could "poll[ ] the individual jurors and, depending upon the responses and
appearances ... guid[ e] them toward another appropriate period of deliberation" so long as the
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jurors do not declare themselves deadlocked. 114 Idaho at 813. That is not what the district court
did here. The district court did not poll the individual jurors or ask if they were deadlocked. And
the court did not guide the jury toward another period of deliberation. Instead, the district court
pointed to the blank lines on the second page of the verdict form, and instructed the jury, "we
need you to evaluate the other count." (Tr., p.1511, Ls.12-13; Con£ Docs., p.56.) To a jury
deliberating at 9:30 p.m., after six days of trial, that had already declared to the court it could not
reach a unanimous decision, this instruction was coercive. Significantly, there was no line for the
jury to check in order to indicate it could not reach a unanimous verdict. 4 (Con£ Docs., p.56.)
This case is most analogous to State v. Pullin, 152 Idaho 82 (Ct. App. 2011). In Pullen,
after over 90 minutes of deliberations, the jury sent a note to the trial court stating it could not
come to a unanimous decision. Id. at 85. With the approval of counsel, the trial court asked the
jury to deliberate further. Id. at 85-86. Approximately 30 minutes later, the jury returned verdicts
of guilty on both counts. Id. at 86. The Court of Appeals reviewed the defendant's claim of
instructional error for fundamental error, since there was no objection below. Id. The Court
recognized the timeline "may suggest the possibility of coercion" but held the defendant could
not establish he was denied an unwaived constitutional right, which is the first prong of
fundamental error review. Id. Judge Melanson agreed there was no constitutional violation, but
wrote separately to explain that, in his view, the instruction given by the trial court violated the
Flint Court's prohibition against dynamite instructions. Id. at 88. Judge Melanson explained that

"the purpose of the Flint ruling was to avoid even the risk that these instructions might have a
coercive effect upon minority jurors and also avoid the need for appellate review of instructions

4

The only way for the jury to complete the second page of the verdict form was to check "not
guilty" or "guilty" and then, if guilty, to indicate whether the verdict was based on fellatio or
cunnilingus. (Conf. Docs., p.56.)
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of this kind in order to attempt to determine whether there was such an effect." Id. Ultimately,
Judge Melanson concurred in the result because the instruction violated only a rule of the court,
and did not constitute fundamental error. See id.
Here, counsel for Mr. Gomez argued to the district court that the instruction it gave was
"close to the border of a dynamite instruction or over," and filed a motion for a new trial based
on this instruction. (See R., p.555.) Unlike in Pullin, Mr. Gomez does not need to show
fundamental error in order to get relief on appeal. He is entitled to relief because he can show the
instruction given by the district court might have had a coercive effect upon minority jurors.
Even if the district court's instruction to the jury did not rise to the level of a dynamite
instruction, it was still coercive, as it may have misled the jury to believe it had to reach a verdict
on Count II. In State v. Gomez, 137 Idaho 671 (2002), the Idaho Supreme Court vacated a verdict
based on two errors, one of which was that the trial court may have misled the jury regarding
what would happen if the jury could not reach a unanimous verdict. The Court explained that the
error required reversal, even though it did not rise to the level of a dynamite instruction:
It is apparent that the jury had difficulty reaching a verdict. It is quite possible that
the district court's comments left the jury with the impression that if it did not
reach verdict, there would not be another trial. The court's comments did not
amount to a dynamite instruction, but they may well have misled the jury.

Id. at 677.
The district court's instruction to the jury here that the verdict form it provided "isn't
quite in order yet" and that "[w ]e need to have a decision on Count II" quite possibly left the jury
with the impression that it had to reach a verdict of guilty or not guilty on Count II, as there was
no way for the jury to indicate it was deadlocked. (Con£ Docs., p.56.) The court's error in
providing this instruction to the jury requires reversal either as a prohibited dynamite instruction,
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or as a coercive instruction just short of a dynamite instruction. Following Flint, it is not proper
for a trial court to provide an instruction that may have a coercive effect upon minority jurors.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Gomez respectfully requests that the Court vacate his conviction for infamous crime
against nature and remand this case to the district court for entry of a judgment of acquittal.
DATED this 21 st day of October, 2019.
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